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I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholder derivative suits in federal court may be settled
only with the express approval of the district judge hearing the
case.' If the settlement is not approved, litigants may proceed to
trial or attempt to appeal the disapproval order. Until recently, only
one court had considered the issue of the appealability of disap-
proval orders, holding that they fell within the "collateral order"
exception' to the final decision limitation' on appellate court juris-
diction and thus could be considered on appeal prior to trial.' A
Second Circuit panel, however, recently rejected the applicability
of the collateral order exception to a district court's refusal to ap-
prove a shareholder derivative suit settlement and held such an
1. FED. R. Cv. P. 23.1.
2. See text accompanying note 7 infra.
3. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), federal appellate courts may entertain appeals only
from "final decisions." See text accompanying notes 11-12 infra. A number of judicial and
statutory exceptions, including the collateral order doctrine, have prevented inflexible appli-
cation of the final judgment rule. See note 18 infra.
4. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
One other circuit court, however, has considered the merits of a disapproval order without
addressing the appealability question. In re Int'l House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation, 487
F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1973).
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order nonappealable under 28 U.S.C. section 1291.1
Although the final judgment rule has been'a principal tenet of
the federal judicial system since its inception, application of the rule
has not been free from difficulty.' Similarly, the collateral order
exception has been applied inconsistently. The collateral order doc-
trine generally states that some orders, although not terminating
the litigation, are sufficiently separable from the merits of the ac-
tion and sufficiently dispositive of independent rights, that review
should not be deferred until final adjudication of the entire case.7
Courts and commentators have reached varied conclusions on the
doctrine's proper scope, asserting alternatively that it should be
interpreted narrowly,' or that it should be construed liberally to
facilitate a pragmatic balancing approach to appealability ques-
tions.? In a series of recent decisions dealing with this doctrine, the
Supreme Court has indicated a preference for the narrow interpreta-
tion.'" Although these decisions have not expressly purported to
reformulate the collateral order test, the Court's language clearly
evidences a retrenchment from earlier decisions espousing a prag-
matic approach.
This Recent Development will trace briefly the history of the
collateral order doctrine, focusing on recent treatment by the Su-
preme Court. After an examination of the elements of a district
court's decision to approve or disapprove a derivative suit settle-
ment, the Recent Development will analyze the conflicting results
reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second and
Ninth Circuits in light of the Supreme Court's apparent retrench-
ment. Although finding that the Second Circuit's decision to reject
appealability is most consistent with recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements, this Recent Development submits that the Supreme
Court has adopted an overly restrictive standard that precludes
evaluation of vital policy considerations. Finally, the Recent Devel-
opment concludes that the Second Circuit's decision also represents
the best accommodation of competing policy concerns.
5. Seigal v. Merrick, Nos. 77-7566, 75-7576 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 1978).
6. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach To Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 CoLuM.
L. REv. 89, 90 (1975). The finality requirement was imposed originally in § 22 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789. 1 Stat. 73, 84. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178-79
(1955). For a discussion of the rule's historical development, see Crick, The Final Judgment
as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 541-51 (1932).
7. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
8. See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455
F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972).
9. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Dickinson v. Petroleum
Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950); Redish, supra note 6.
10. See notes 35-51 infra and accompanying text.
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II. THE FINAL ORDER RULE AND THE COLLATERAL ORDER ExCEPTION
The finality rule in the federal system is presently codified in
28 U.S.C. section 1291, which states in relevant part that "the
courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . ."" A
"final" decision has been defined traditionally as one that ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves the court with no further task
except execution of the judgment.12 The primary purposes of the
final judgment rule include the avoidance of delay that would result
from piecemeal review, and the promotion of judicial efficiency." In
addition, the rule seeks to promote better informed decisions on the
part of appellate judges" and to maintain the appropriate relation-
ship between trial and appellate courts by preventing the latter
from usurping the fact-finding function." Finally, the rule may
serve to reduce the number of issues to be considered on appeal
because many potentially appealable rulings are corrected during
the trial or are mooted by the outcome." Despite these beneficial
objectives, the rule has not been applied uniformly, perhaps in rec-
ognition of the potential hardship that inflexible application would
produce." Although various statutory and judicial exceptions have
modified the finality concept to allow certain interlocutory appeals,
only the collateral order doctrine is potentially applicable to a dis-
trict court order refusing to approve a shareholder derivative suit
settlement. 1
The collateral order doctrine was first enunciated in Cohen v.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). A similar requirement exists for Supreme Court jurisdiction
over state court cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). Although some commentators have argued
that the scope of these two statutes should differ, e.g., Boskey, Finality of State Court
Judgments Under the Federal Judicial Code, 43 CoLum. L. REV. 1002 (1943), treatment by
federal courts appears to be largely equivalent. See Frank, Requiem For the Final Judgment
Rule, 45 TEx. L. REV. 292, 295 (1966); 73 YALE L.J. 515 (1964).
12. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R. v.
Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28 (1883).
13. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940).
14. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1891).
15. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2462 (1978); Parkinson v. April
Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975).
16. Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of
Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1978).
17. See Redish, supra note 6, at 90-91.
18. The most significant statutory exception to the finality requirement is 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), which allows appeal from an order in a civil action upon certification by the district
court that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Following such certification, the court
19791 987
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Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.," which considered a stockholder
derivative suit brought in federal court on diversity grounds. Defen-
dants in Cohen attempted to invoke a state statute requiring a
plaintiff to post a security bond to reimburse defendants for reason-
able expenses if the latter prevailed at trial. The district court held
the state law inapplicable in federal court and defendant appealed.
In ruling that 28 U.S.C. section 1291 did not bar appeal despite the
absence of a final judgment, the Supreme Court noted initially that
the district court's decision on the security issue was final and would
not be reopened. 20 Furthermore, the Court stated that the order did
not make any step toward final disposition and was not affected by
the merits of the case. Thus the Court concluded that:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi-
cated.21
The Cohen Court thus identified a number of factors contribut-
ing to the decision to allow appeal without indicating whether all
or merely some had to be satisfied in a particular case. Subsequent
of appeals has discretion to hear or reject the appeal. Although disapproval of a shareholder's
derivative action compromise could conceivably raise a "controlling question of law," disap-
proval normally results from a factual determination that the proposed settlement is unfair.
See notes 52-58 infra and accompanying text. Other statutory exemptions to the finality
requirement include the mandamus power of appellate review provided for by the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and the provision in Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allowing appeal of orders that are final with respect to only certain parties or issues
in multiple party litigation upon certificaton by the district judge. These provisions are
inapplicable in the instant context.
In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) authorizes courts of appeal to review
"[ilnterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing
or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court." Although an argument can be constructed that a
district order disapproving a proposed settlement is in effect an injunction against compro-
mise, federal courts generally have been unwilling to expand § 1292(a)(1) beyond the historic
concept of an injunction. See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcrICE 110.20[1], at 232-38 (2d ed.
1975); see, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 98 S.Ct. 2451 (1978) (denial of
class certification may not be appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as an order refusing an
injunction). Significantly, the applicability of this section was apparently not argued in either
of the circuit court cases considering the appealability of an order disapproving compromise.
Also inapplicable in the present inquiry are two additional judicially developed excep-
tions to the finality requirement: the doctrine enunciated in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 201 (1848), which provides for immediate appeal of cases in which the substantive
issues have been decided and to delay appeal would render it valueless; and the so-called
"death knell" doctrine, which the Supreme Court recently invalidated in Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 98 S.Ct. 2454 (1978). See notes 41-51 infra and accompanying text.
19. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
20. Id. at 546.
21. Id.
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decisions suggested that the Cohen test would not be applied rigor-
ously. In Swift & Co. v. Compania Colombiana22 the Court allowed
appeal of an order somewhat similar to that in Cohen, employing
language that suggested a more relaxed test. Plaintiff in Compania
Colombiana brought a libel in personam in federal district court
charging negligent nondelivery of a sea cargo by a foreign steam-
ship company. Plaintiff also attached a vessel allegedly owned by
defendants. The district court dissolved the attachment pending
trial, holding that plaintiff had failed to establish that defendants
owned the ship.? The Supreme Court held appeal of the order pro-
per, stating that review at a later date might be an "empty rite" and
that the claim was "fairly severable from the context of a larger
litigious process."24
In Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau25 the Court indicated
that the appealability problem might be affected by considerations
of fairness to appellants. Mercantile Bank confronted the issue
whether a federal or state venue statute controlled in a fraud action
brought by an insurance company against two national banks in
Texas state court. The Texas Supreme Court had denied defen-
dants' motion for change of venue, holding that the state statute
controlled. Before reaching the merits, the United States Supreme
Court addressed appellee's argument that the trial court's venue
ruling was not a final order and thus was nonappealable. In rejecting
this argument, the Court first noted that the venue question was a
separate and independent matter anterior to the merits and not
enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising plaintiffs cause
of action.2 ' In addition, the Court asserted that the policy underly-
ing the requirement of finality" was better served by presently de-
termining the venue question rather than by subjecting the parties
to long and complex litigation that might be rendered useless by a
subsequent venue ruling on appeal.?
The Court temporarily abandoned the requirement that non-
final orders must at least be "collateral" in Gillespie v. United
States Steel Corp.,2 stating that the requirement of finality is to be
22. 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
23. Id. at 689.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
26. Id. at 558.
27. Because Mercantile Bank considered an appeal from a state court, the finality
requirement imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1257, rather than that in § 1291, was in issue. See note
11 supra.
28. 371 U.S. at 558.
29. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
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given a practical rather than a technical construction.3 0 The
Gillespie Court asserted that the finality issue is frequently so close
that application of a rigid test is unworkable.3 Thus the Court held
that such questions should be resolved by an evaluation of the com-
peting considerations: the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal re-
view versus the danger of denying justice by delay.2 In addition to
finding the latter consideration compelling in Gillespie, the Court
characterized the question on appeal as "fundamental to the further
conduct of the case."33 The pragmatic approach to finality articu-
lated in Gillespie was reiterated by the Court in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin.3 1
In a series of recent opinions, the Burger Court has suggested
that the increasingly liberal approach to finality and to the Cohen
doctrine is at an end. The first of these decisions, Abney v. United
States," considered the appealability of a district court order deny-
ing a criminal36 defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment on
double jeopardy grounds. Although ultimately finding the order
30. In Gillespie an administratrix brought an action in federal court against a shipowner
seeking recovery for the death of her son, an employee of the shipowner. Plaintiff, alleging
that the shipowner's negligence was the cause of death, claimed the right to recover for herself
and decedent's brother and sisters under the Jones Act, which subjected employers to liability
for negligently causing injury or death to seamen. In addition, plaintiff sought recovery under
an Ohio wrongful death statute. The district court held that the Jones Act was the exclusive
remedy and also that plaintiff could not recover on behalf of her other children. The circuit
court examined the merits without reaching the question of appealability. Applying a prag-
matic balancing approach, the Supreme Court upheld the appealability of the trial court
ruling, despite characterizing the appealability of the order as "marginal." Id. at 152-54.
Thus, although the order appealed from primarily raised questions of law, it was clearly
enmeshed in the merits of the case. The approach taken in Gillespie, however, has recently
met with Supreme Court disapproval. See text accompanying notes 45-46 infra.
31. 379 U.S. at 152.
32. Id. at 153.
33. Id. at 154. The Gillespie Court did not elaborate on the specific role of this concept.
Although subsequent decisions have not relied on the notion of "fundamental" importance,
an evaluation of the importance of the issue appealed plays an inevitable role in appealability
cases.
34. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (allowing appeal of a district court order requiring defendant
in a class action to bear the cost of notifying class members).
35. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
36. Numerous Supreme Court decisions have indicated that adherence to the rule of
finality should be particularly stringent in criminal prosecutions because "the delays and
disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal are especially inimical to the effective and
fair administration of the criminal law." DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962).
See also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940). Although this factor may
have played a part in the decisions in Abney and United States v. MacDonald, discussed in
notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text, the Court's discussions of the finality requirement
expressly extended to civil cases. Moreover, the case most clearly reflecting theoretical re-
trenchment, Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, arose in the civil context. See notes 41-51 infra
and accompanying text.
SETTLEMENT DISAPPROVAL ORDERS
appealable,3 the Court indicated a marked shift in its approach to
the problem of appealability. Before examining the particular order
before it, the Court stated that appealability questions must be
considered in light of two principles: the absence of a constitutional
right to appeal and the "firm congressional policy" against interlo-
cutory or piecemeal review. 8 The following Term in United States
v. MacDonald," the Court again emphasized the disfavored status
of interlocutory appeals and the importance of finality as a predi-
cate to federal court jurisdiction in holding that a defendant, prior
to trial, may not appeal an order denying his motion to dismiss on
speedy trial grounds."
The retrenchment from previous finality decisions was mani-
fested clearly during the 1977 Term. In Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay"' the Court held that a district court determination that a
suit may not be maintained as a class action is not appealable prior
to trial. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, began his analysis
by reiterating the traditional rule that federal appellate jurisdiction
generally depends on the existence of a decision that ends the litiga-
tion on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute
the judgment on the merits.4 2 Because an order denying class action
status is not final in that sense, Justice Stevens noted that the order
was appealable only if it fell within an appropriate exception to the
final judgment rule. First considering the collateral order exception,
Justice Stevens in effect reformulated the Cohen test, stating that
all three strands of Cohen must be met to obtain appeal: "[T]he
order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,
and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."
Finding that an order denying class certification failed to satisfy the
three-pronged test, the Court held Cohen inapplicable."
37. The Court found the order collateral because it was completely separate from the
principal issue of guilt and because post-trial review would be ineffective since the double
jeopardy clause protects an individual not only against being subjected to double punish-
ment, but also against being twice tried for the same offense. 431 U.S. at 657-62.
38. Id. at 656-57.
39. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
40. The Court attempted to distinguish MacDonald from Abney, asserting that resolu-
tion of a speedy trial claim necessitates a careful assessment of the particular facts of -the
case, including the degree to which the defendant has been prejudiced, and thus should be
considered only after the relevant facts are developed at trial. Id. at 1551.
41. 98 S.Ct. 2454 (1978).
42. Id. at 2457.
43. Id. at 2458 (emphasis added). Neither the conjunctivity of the test nor the
"completely separate" language was present in Cohen.
44. Id. The Court's application of this test was cursory at best. See text accompanying
note 51 infra.
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The Court relegated to a footnote respondent's argument that
Gillespie supported the appealability of a class designation order as
a matter of right. Justice Stevens asserted that the Gillespie Court
had upheld appeal of a "marginal" final order because the appeal
presented a question of national significance and because the final-
ity issue had not been raised until argument on the merits. Thus the
policy of judicial economy served by the finality requirement would
not have been achieved had Gillespie been remanded without a
decision.'- Justice Stevens therefore concluded that if Gillespie were
extended beyond its own unique facts, the final order rule."would
be stripped of all significance."6 Although the precise import of this
footnote is unclear, the Court's language strongly suggested disap-
proval of the balance-of-competing-factors approach employed in
Gillespie.
In addition to its narrow interpretation of Cohen and Gillespie,
Livesay invalidated another exception to the final judgment
rule-the so-called "death knell" doctrine, under which an order
that is likely to sound the "death knell" of the litigation is appeala-
ble.17 Utilizing this judicial doctrine, a number of circuit courts had
allowed appeals of class certification denials, reasoning that without
the incentive of a possible group recovery, the plaintiff might find
it economically uninviting to pursue the action to a final judgment
and then seek appellate review of the adverse class determination."
Justice Stevens attacked the death knell doctrine on several
grounds. He argued that because appealability would depend on the
court's perception of the impact of denial in a particular case, re-
sults would be inconsistent and judicial resources would be ex-
pended unnecessarily in individualized scrutiny." In addition, the
Court asserted that allowing appeals from nonfinal orders that turn
on the facts of a particular case "thrusts appellate courts indiscrimi-
nately into the trial process" and therefore disrupts the appropriate
relationship between the respective courts.'" Thus Justice Ste-
vens concluded that the prospect that a plaintiff might abandon his
45. 98 S.Ct. at 2462 n.30.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2458.
48. E.g., Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975); Hartmann
v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973).
49. 98 S.Ct. at 2459-60.
50. Id. at 2462. This assertion is questionable. The courts of appeals are in the business
of reviewing district court orders "that turn on the facts of a particular case"; such is their
appropriate relationship with trial courts. Certainly, allowing appeals from nonfinal orders
interrupts the trial process. The policy arguably undermined by this interruption, however,
is that of avoiding piecemeal litigation. The relationship between trial and appellate courts
remains the same regardless of the time of appeal.
992 [Vol. 32:985
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claim before final judgment provided an insufficient reason for con-
sidering an order final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 1291.
Although the Livesay Court's invalidation of the death knell
doctrine in theory has no direct effect on the collateral order doc-
trine, it demonstrates the pervasiveness of the Court's restrictive
approach toward appealability. The Court's cursory modification
and application of the collateral order test are of even more import-
ance because of their direct impact on the derivative suit settlement
question. In support of the conclusion that an order denying class
certification is not "collateral," the Court simply asserted that such
an order is subject to revision in the district court, requires consider-
ation of factors enmeshed in the legal issue comprising plaintiff's
cause of action, and may be effectively reviewed after final judg-
ment.5' These arguments, conclusory at best, are questionable.
First, although a district court may have discretionary authority to
revise the denial of certification, reconsideration by the trial judge
after trial has begun would appear sufficiently unlikely to provide
a reasonable basis for denying appeal. Second, "enmeshment" with
the merits of the case is tenuous. To make the certification determi-
nation, a district court need consider only the relationship of the
claims of the prospective class members to each other. Evaluation
of the merits of any of those claims against the defendant is unnec-
essary. Last, review following trial cannot be characterized as
"effective" if the order in fact results in the abandonment of the
claim. Thus the Court's treatment of Cohen, combined with its
disapproval of the Gillespie approach, indicates that future applica-
tion of the collateral order doctrine will be carefully limited to orders
completely satisfying all elements of the reformulated test.
III. Dismiar COURT EVALUATION OF A PROPOSED SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE Surr SETTLEMENT
Once the opposing parties in a federal derivative suit negotiate
a compromise, the settlement must be submitted for court approval
as required by Rule 23.1. The district court sets a hearing date and
orders that all shareholders be notified. At the hearing all interested
parties may offer evidence in support of or in opposition to the
proposed settlement. Approval, which rests in the discretion of the
court, generally is granted if the settlement is in the interest of the
class or corporation represented by plaintiffs.52 A compromise must
51. Id. at 2458.
52. See Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions, 23 Sw. L.J.
765, 792 (1969).
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serve that interest in order to be deemed fair and reasonable.'
In evaluating a settlement's "fairness," the district court's pri-
mary task is to weigh the benefits of the compromise against the
likelihood of recovery." Clearly, the adequacy of a particular settle-
ment depends not only upon the damage suffered by the class or the
corporation, but also upon the probability of success at trial. Thus,
in addition to considering the fairness of an amount and the equity
of its proposed distribution, a court must attempt to appraise the
factors that will affect the ultimate outcome, including the presence
of serious questions of law and the extent to which the case turns
on disputed issues of fact."5 To evaluate these factors effectively, a
court must go beyond the arguments of counsel and scrutinize avail-
able evidence."6 This necessity places the court in a delicate position
because the central purpose of compromise is to avoid the expenses
and delay of trial. The court is concerned only with the likelihood
of success and should avoid any actual determination of the mer-
its.57 Thus the court should receive only enough proof to evaluate the
litigation's probable outcome, not enough to decide it.5
If the court rejects a settlement as unreasonably low or other-
wise unfair, the parties are free to renegotiate." Any subsequent
proposal, however, must be submitted to the court for consideration
at a new hearing. Alternatively, the parties may attempt to appeal
the court's disapproval order. Because such an order does not termi-
nate the action, however, parties seeking appellate review must rely
on the collateral order doctrine to avoid the traditional finality re-
quirement. 0
53. Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d 159, 163 (8th Cir. 1961); Masterson v. Pergament, 203
F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Schreiber v. Jacobs, 128 F. Supp.
44, 50 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
54. Protective Comm. for Independant Stockholders v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25
(1968); Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571-73 (5th Cir. 1960); Masterson
v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
55. See Haudek, supra note 52, at 794.
56. Id. at 794-95. Haudek notes that the inadequacy or lack of evidence is perhaps the
most frequent ground for the judicial rejection of a settlement.
57. Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960); In re
Prudence Co., 98 F.2d 559, 560 (2d Cir. 1938); Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D.
175, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
58. Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Schrieber v. Jacobs, 128
F. Supp. 44, 50 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
59. Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1946); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533,
534 (D.R.I. 1953).
60. As noted previously, the collateral order doctrine is the only exception arguably
applicable to such an appeal. See note 18 supra.
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IV. DISAPPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AS A COLLATERAL ORDER
A. Appeal Allowed: Norman v. McKee
The first case to consider the appealability of an order denying
approval of a proposed shareholder derivative suit settlement was
Norman v. McKee." Considering the question prior to recent Su-
preme Court developments, the Ninth Circuit noted the pragmatic
approach employed in finality cases, citing both Cohen and
Gillespie. The court first applied the Cohen test, finding the disap-
proval order "collateral" because it was independent of the merits,
was not a step toward final disposition or an "ingredient of the cause
of action," and represented a final resolution of the question
whether the proposed settlement should be given judicial ap-
proval."
Although finding Cohen satisfied, the McKee court neverthe-
less addressed the Gillespie balance between "the inconvenience
and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of
denying justice on the other."83 In view of the complex and lengthy
nature of derivative suits, the court found the danger of piecemeal
review to be of diminished importance." The court also noted the
duty incumbent upon plaintiffs to represent the class fairly, assert-
ing that the right of unnamed plaintiffs to fair representation might
be infringed by an erroneous disapproval of a settlement. To such
parties, the court continued, the disapproval of a settlement would
only delay justice." Concluding that the inconvenience of piecemeal
review was outweighed by the danger of denying justice due to
delay, the court held the order appealable.
B. Appeal Denied: Seigal v. Merrick
The Second Circuit panel in Seigal v. Merrick" recently
reached a contrary resolution of the identical question decided in
McKee. The court, citing Livesay, initially asserted that Cohen had
"spawned a host of legitimate and illegitimate progeny" and should
be read narrowly to prevent the exception from undermining the
benefits of the final judgment rule.' Quoting the Supreme Court's
language, the court reasserted that allowing appeals of right from
61. 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970).
62. Id. at 773.
63. Id. at 774.
64. Id.
65. Id. This strand of the court's analysis is unsound. See text accompanying note
83 infra.
66. 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978).
67. Id. at 37.
19791 995
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
nonfinal orders that turn on the facts of a particular case thrusts
appellate courts indiscriminately into the trial process and disrupts
the proper relationship between trial and appellate courts."
The court next focused upon the decision to approve or disap-
prove a settlement, a determination which it characterized as an
amalgam of fact and law. The court stated that a disapproval order
failed to satisfy the requirement that an order, to be appealable,
must conclusively determine the disputed question, arguing that
disapproval is based partially on an assessment of the merits and
permits the parties to proceed with the litigation or to propose a
different settlement." In addition, the court stated that the settle-
ment process is not a deviation from the main path of litigation, but
is rather "a step on that path directly leading to final judgment."71,
Noting that an approval of a compromise becomes a final judgment,
the court suggested that a disapproval of a compromise that would
have resulted in a final judgment had it been approved did not differ
from a denial of summary judgment or the grant of a new trial,
neither of which is appealable.7'
The Seigal court also rejected appellant's argument that the
district court judge had abused her discretion in failing to evaluate
plaintiff's likelihood of success at trial.72 Suggesting that the trial
judge might evaluate the appropriate factors on remand and never-
theless reach an identical result, the court concluded that a remand
order would be pointless. In addition, the court noted that if the
present appeal were allowed and the trial court's disapproval af-
firmed, the appellate court might be required to entertain appeals
from subsequent orders disapproving modified settlement proposals
in the same case.
Finally, the Seigal court acknowledged the contrary result
reached in McKee. Addressing the balancing approach employed by
the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit again asserted that the denial
of justice argument would inevitably undermine the finality rule.7
In addition, the court expressed the belief that, since the decision
in McKee, a "contrary trend" manifested by the decision in Livesay
had been established in the Supreme Court's view of appealability.4
68. Id. at 38.
69. Id. at 37-38.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 38.
72. District Judge Motley apparently considered only the amount of the settlement. Id.
at 38-39.
73. Id. at 39.
74. Id.
996 [Vol. 32:985
SETTLEMENT DISAPPROVAL ORDERS
C. Proper Analysis of the Appealability
Question in Seigal and McKee
The McKee court viewed the disapproval order as a final resolu-
tion of the question whether the proposed settlement should be
given judicial approval. The court held such an order collateral,
arguing that it is independent of the merits and does not constitute
a step toward final disposition of the case. Conversely, the Seigal
court asserted that disapproval of a compromise does not conclu-
sively resolve the disputed question, but is a step on the path to final
judgment, analogizing to a denial of summary judgment. In addi-
tion, the court noted that disapproval is based partially on an as-
sessment of the merits of the case. Although these conflicting results
can be partially explained by the more restrictive view of finality
taken by the Second Circuit panel, the primary source of divergence
lies in confusion over the precise question confronted by a district
court in deciding whether to approve or disapprove a proposed com-
promise in a shareholder derivative suit.
The McKee court's conclusion that a decision to disapprove
compromise is independent of the merits is not entirely accurate. In
considering a proposed settlement, a district court must evaluate
the likelihood of plaintiffs' success at trial. Of course, the court does
not attempt any resolution of the merits at this stage. Thus the
assertion in Seigal that the order constituted a step on the path to
final judgment is erroneous; the decision to approve or disapprove
has no effect on the court's final judgment if the case proceeds to
trial.'- Nevertheless, the merits of the case play an important part
in the decision to approve or disapprove a compromise.
Yet the decision to approve or disapprove a settlement, which
determines the fairness of a proposed compromise, is in a real sense
separate from the decision after trial on the merits, which deter-
mines the amount of plaintiffs' damages, if any, and orders appro-
priate compensation. Resolution of the question whether a settle-
ment is "fair" is based upon only an incomplete and summary eval-
uation of the merits and does not purport to ascertain damages or
causation with any degree of preciseness. The fact that courts ap-
prove the large majority of proposed settlements7 1 indicates that
75. Of course, if the judge is the finder of fact in the subsequent trial, his ultimate
decision will be based on the evidence introduced at trial, some of which may have been
presented at the settlement proposal hearing. This simply indicates, however, that similar
considerations affect both the disapproval order and final judgment, not that the order itself
has any effect on final judgment. A disapproval order constitutes a "step" toward final
resolution only in the sense that the former precedes the latter.
76. Haudek, supra note 52, at 793.
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they require only that a compromise approximately reflect the prob-
able outcome at trial. More importantly, in determining whether to
approve, the court is concerned only that the settlement is fair to
the shareholders. The purpose of the approval requirement is to
protect those shareholders who have an interest in the action but
who have no control over the course of the litigation.77 A court is not
concerned with protecting defendants' interests and would approve
a compromise even if initial evaluation of the merits suggested an
eventual recovery lower than that proposed in the settlement. Thus
the Seigal court's assertion that a disapproval order does not conclu-
sively determine the disputed question is erroneous.
It should be noted that the fact that the decision to approve or
disapprove a compromise determines whether the parties will be
forced to bear the burden of further litigation has no effect what-
soever on the question whether a disapproval order answers a ques-
tion separate from the determination of the merits. As noted by the
Seigal court, a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, which
does address the merits, also determines whether trial is necessary.
The difference, however, is that these two court orders decide
whether trial is required by answering different questions: a sum-
mary judgment ruling potentially decides the merits, while a settle-
ment order merely considers the merits in resolving a separate issue.
Thus the Seigal court's analogy is unhelpful.
Despite the conclusiveness of a disapproval order and its unre-
viewability following trial," the foregoing discussion indicates that
such an order fails to satisfy one element of the rigid Livesay stan-
dard-that the order resolve an issue completely separate from the
merits of the action. Although a disapproval order decides a ques-
tion somewhat different from that presented by the merits, a
consideration of merits is a critical element of the settlement ques-
tion. Thus the decision in Seigal was a correct application of the
Livesay reformulation.
D. Livesay Reconsidered
As construed in Livesay, the collateral order exception will not
apply to a court order that requires any consideration of the merits
of the case. Despite the virtue of certainty, the test is simply too
strict. Some nonfinal decisions that hinge partially on the merits of
the case have so substantial and immediate an impact upon the
77. See 590 F.2d at 37-38; Haudek, supra note 52, at 792-93.
78. After a full trial determining the extent of defendant's liability, the fairness of a
pretrial settlement proposal is clearly a moot issue.
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parties to an action that interlocutory review must be allowed. For
example, a request for a preliminary injunction requires a court to
examine the merits to determine if plaintiff has a probability of
success at trial." Yet, such an injunction is, by statute, appealable
prior to final judgment, reflecting congressional recognition of the
potentially irreversible effect on the defendant's rights. 0 Similarly,
the federal courts should not be bound by an appealability standard
so rigid that they cannot respond equitably to the almost limitless
range of potential court orders.
In its original articulation of the collateral order doctrine, the
Cohen Court did not purport to create an inflexible test capable of
mechanical application. The approach implicit in Cohen and more
visible in subsequent cases was sufficiently pragmatic to permit an
evaluation of relevant policy considerations, including the policies
underlying the finality rule and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the
impact on the parties. This approach is sound: if the application of
a judicially created test does not allow consideration of underlying
policies, application may become counterproductive. Thus the ap-
pealability question should be resolved by a consideration of "the
inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and
the danger of denying justice on the other,"" particularly when, as
in the case of orders disapproving derivative suit settlements, the
different components of the judicial standard yield conflicting re-
sults.
Interestingly, both the McKee and Seigal courts addressed the
propriety of appeal from a policy standpoint, although the latter
decision purported to follow the mechanical Livesay approach. The
primary factors militating against pretrial review of a compromise
disapproval are those policies underlying the final judgment rule
itself. Unquestionably, the danger of wasting judicial resources
through piecemeal review is acute in this context. As noted by the
Seigal court, if appeal were allowed, the appellate court might be
required to review a number of orders disapproving various at-
tempts at compromise in a single case. Nevertheless, the McKee
court found that the danger of piecemeal review was of diminished
importance in light of the long and complex trial normally required
in a shareholder's derivative suit. This argument, although not
79. W. A. Mack, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 260 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1958); Henson v.
Hoth, 258 F. Supp. 33 (D. Colo. 1966).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976). For the history and policies behind this rule, see
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1963)
(Friendly, J., dissenting).
81. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
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without merit, is ultimately unpersuasive. To review a disapproval
order, an appellate court would be required to scrutinize all factors
leading to the district court's decision, which itself required consid-
erable factual scrutiny. Although this process would be less time
consuming than a full-scale trial, the disapproval order, as a finding
of fact, would be reversible only if clearly erroneous.12 Thus the vast
majority of disapprovals would be affirmed on appeal. This fact,
combined with the possibility of multiple appeals from a single
action, compels the conclusion that judicial economy would be best
served by denying appeal.
The McKee court additionally asserted that disapproval of a
settlement would delay justice for the unnamed plaintiffs, infring-
ing upon their right to fair representation. This argument fails to
recognize that if a settlement proposal is in fact unfair, its approval
would hardly achieve justice. Certainly, denying interlocutory ap-
peal may postpone resolution. The unnamed plaintiffs, however, do
not bear the burden and expense of trial. Moreover, as noted above,
the great majority of disapproval orders will not be reversible.
In summary, the excessive cost of interlocutory review of disap-
proval orders is not outweighed by the minimal danger of denying
justice. This conclusion rests, however, on an assumption that a
district court has evaluated the necessary factors in reaching its
factual determination. This was not the case in Seigal, in which the
trial court failed to consider the likelihood of success at trial. Thus
the court's conclusion was not a pure finding of fact, but was defec-
tive as a matter of law: without an appraisal of the probability of
success on the merits, the fairness of a settlement proposal cannot
be adjudged. If no chance of success at trial exists, an order disap-
proving a compromise as unfair to the plaintiffs is clearly erroneous.
Failure to consider this integral factor renders an order defective."
Stated alternatively, the district court judge abuses his discretion
by failing to consider the factors necessary to properly evaluate the
fairness issue. Thus appeal from an order disapproving compromise
in a shareholder derivative suit should be allowed only when an
appellant can demonstrate that the district court abused its discre-
tion by failing to consider a settlement's fairness in relation to both
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
83. The Seigal court argued that appeal under these circumstances was pointless be-
cause the district court might evaluate the proper factors on remand and nevertheless reach
an identical result. This argument carries the policies behind finality to an untenable ex-
treme. When the district court has not considered the probability of success at trial, the
fairness of a proposed compromise has in effect not been evaluated, and disapproval has been
improperly granted. Under such circumstances, the rights of all parties have been violated
flagrantly and appeal is necessary.
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the. damages allegedly sustained and the likelihood of success at
trial. If the order on its face purports to consider these factors,
appeal should be denied, regardless of the decision's factual correct-
ness.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent circuit court decisions have reached conflicting answers
to the question whether a district court order disapproving a pro-
posed compromise in a shareholder derivative action is appealable
under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. Res-
olution of this issue is affected by recent Supreme Court decisions
indicating a retrenchment from the pragmatic approach formerly
taken toward the finality requirement and, in effect, reformulating
the collateral order test. Rigid application of this new standard will
foreclose evaluation of appropriate policy considerations and will
overly restrict the ability of appellate courts to deal effectively with
appealability questions. In holding that orders disapproving deriva-
tive suit settlements are not appealable, the Second Circuit panel
in Seigal v. Merrick reached a result consistent with the Supreme
Court's formulation of the collateral order test. More importantly,
this result reflects the proper conclusion that, in such a case, the
inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review outweigh the minimal
danger of denying justice. This conclusion is valid, however, only
when the basis of the district court decision was an evaluation of the
factors necessary to determine the fairness of a settlement proposal.
When the district court judge ignores the appropriate considera-
tions, his decision to disapprove settlement is defective as a matter
of law and appellate review is necessary.
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